In a recent comment, it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad, V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A, 67, 044302, (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.
To set up the context and the notations, it is appropriate to first review briefly the protocol itself [1] and the basic feature of the attack or cheating suggested in [2] .
1 The basic steps of the protocol and the cheating First we need the concept of a reusable secure carrier [3] , . A Bell state like
shared between Alice(a) and Bob(b) can be used as a reusable secure carrier between two parties as follows. Alice entangles a qubit |q 1 by the action of a CNOT gate C a1 (acting on the qubit 1 and controlled by a), which produces a state like
At the destination Bob disentangles the qubit by a CNOT operation C b1 , leaving the carrier in its original state for reusing. During the transmission the qubit has been disguised in a highly mixed state. Any of the Bell states
can be used as a carrier.
For three parties [1] , a carrier shared between Alice(a), Bob(b) and Charlie(c) can be a GHZ state like
or an even parity state like
Throughout [1] , the comment [2] and the present reply the subscripts a, b and c are used for the quibts shared by, or the local operators acted by, Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively, while the subscripts 1 and 2 are used for the qubits sent to Bob and Charlie respectively.
It was shown in [1] that by suitable local operations, Alice can send a qubit q to Bob and Charlie, by entangling it to the above carriers (hence hiding it from Eavesdroppers). In order to share the secret between Bob and Charlie, half of the bits (the bits in the odd rounds) were sent to Bob and Charlie, as states of the form |qq 12 which they could read without the help of each other and the other half (the bits in the even rounds) were sent to them in the form
(|q 0 + |q 1 12 ) which they could use to decipher the value of q only by their cooperation. Note that q = 1 + q mod 2.
In order to be able to send both types of states in disguised form, Alice needs to use two types of carriers, namely the |GHZ carrier for the states |and the |E carrier for the states
(|q 0 + |q 1 ). The interesting point is that the two types of carriers are transformed to each other at the end of every round by the local action of Hadamard gates by the three parties, due to the following easily verified property
An important property which requires careful attention is that the carrier alternates between the above two forms regardless of the value of the qubit q which has been sent to Bob and Charlie by Alice.
In [2] the authors show that in the second round where a qubit say 0 has been encoded as
|00 + |11 12 and entangled to the carrier |E , Bob (assuming that he has access to the channel between Alice and Charlie) can intercept the qubit 2 sent to Charlie (assuming that he has access to the channel used between Alice and Charlie) and perform a suitable unitary operation U b12 , on the state of the carrier and the two bits 1 and 2, to split the carrier |E to two simple carriers of the type 1. This process is shown schematically in figure (1) .
Let us denote by q 2 the qubit sent by Alice in the second round. Bob keeps this qubit for himself and denotes it hereafter byb, since it is now in possession of Bob and plays a role as part of his new carriers.
It is important to note that the pattern of entanglement splitting depends on the value of this qubit q 2 as follows (equation 3 of the comment):
As it stands in [2] , this does not harm the cheating strategy of Bob, since as mentioned before any of the Bell states can be used as a carrier between two parties.
He then uses the above two pairs of entangled states for retrieving the qubits sent by Alice on his own and sending counterfeit qubits to Charlie in a clever way so that to avoid detection after public announcement of subsequence of the bits.
What is crucial in this attack is that Bob acts by Hadamard gates on his qubits b andb along with Alice and Charlie who are doing the same thing at the end of each round. In this way he almost maintains the pattern of the new carriers, which he has created in the second round, between himself and the other two parties. The reason for "almost" is that the Hadamard operations act as follows (equation 4 of the comment):
Thus if the qubit q 2 was zero, the new two-party carriers remain fixed at |φ 
Prevention of cheating
At first sight one may argue that Alice and Charlie who are no longer entangled after Bob's trick, can detect their new disentangled situation (i.e. by testing a Bell inequality) and hence detect Bob's cheating. However this test requires statistical analysis which requires many measurements. In each measurement the carrier collapses and will not be usable anymore. Being in conflict with the whole idea of reusable carrier, we do not follow this line of argument. Instead we modify the protocol in a way which prevents Bob's from entanglement splitting.
To this end we note that the operator H ⊗3 is not the only operator which transforms the carriers |GHZ and |E into each other. Consider a unitary operator of the form
where θ is an arbitrary parameter θ ∈ [0, 2π). For θ = 0 this is the usual Hadamard operator.
Note that
A simple calculation shows that a generalization of (4) is possible in the following form
provided that θ a + θ b + θ c = 0 mod 2π. Therefore in the modified protocol Alice, Bob and Charlie act alternatively by the operators H θa , H θ b , and H θc , and their inverses, on the qubits in their possession. The angles θ a , θ b and θ c can be announced publicly at the beginning of the protocol. We now show that after entanglement splitting, Bob can not retain his pattern of carriers by any operator Ub b which he acts on his qubitsb and b. We need the following 
where we use H a as an abbreviations of H(θ a ) a and so forth. Acting on both sides by H 
